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Introduction 
Prior to its advent in 1869, the world had zero plastic. In 1907, when a fully synthetic 
version of the polymer we now call plastic was invented, humans reveled in the idea that they 
were no longer constrained by the limits of what natural resources could provide. Through World 
War II, the uses for plastic grew exponentially, continuing post-war as a seemingly endless 
number of plastic products became available to the public (Science History Institute). 
Demand for this material has not subsided since, and it is now estimated that 300 million 
tons of plastic are created annually (Paco, 2017). Much of this ends up in the ocean, where an 
estimated garbage truck load of plastic enters the ocean every minute. By 2050, that number will 
quadruple, and there will be more plastic in the ocean than fish (Caverly, 2019). When plastic 
makes it to a landfill, it takes hundreds of years to decompose (State Legislature, 2007).  
Many cling to the concept of recycling as a means of managing this waste stream. 
However, only nine percent of plastic waste is recycled (Caverly, 2019), and this number is 
going down. Recycling is not a solution to plastic waste, and not only because people are not 
choosing to recycle. There is more plastic waste that is captured with the intention of recycling it 
than can actually be recycled. Up until 2017, China was receiving 45 percent of the world’s 
plastic waste (106 million metric tons since 1992). However, this resulted in China polluting the 
air so severely that they enacted their National Sword policy and halted acceptance of nearly all 
plastic from other nations due to human health and pollution concerns. The United States was 
one of the top exporters of plastic to China and now must send its cargo ships filled with plastic 
to other countries, none of which can take on the amount China had been accepting, resulting in 
even more plastic entering landfills (Watson, 2018).  
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With this endless stream of plastic waste still being generated, and seemingly nowhere to 
put it and no way to recycle all of it, single-use plastics – those intended to be used once and 
discarded – are particularly problematic. While there are products such as medical devices that 
ethically one can argue serve a greater purpose in sustaining human life, plastic bags and plastic 
to-go containers that exist simply for convenience and are used once and thrown away are harder 
to justify.  
Many areas across the world and across the United States have chosen to regulate plastic 
as a way of curtailing this waste stream. This effort is often led by regulating plastic bags first 
since plastic bags are a high use product with a staggering environmental impact. This paper 
looks specifically at plastic bags because of the focus that has been placed on them from a 
regulatory standpoint, environmental standpoint and special interest standpoint.  
Americans use 100 billion plastic bags annually, which requires 12 million barrels of oil 
to produce (Applebome), meaning they have a significant impact on the environment. However, 
not everyone wants plastic bags regulated. Of the $4 trillion global plastics industry, plastic bags 
and plastic “pouches” are a $22.2 billion global industry, with the United States portion 
estimated at over $10 billion, making this a formidable sector of the economy (Maldonado, 
Ritchie and Kahn, 2020; Lerner, 2019; Statista Research Department, 2019). Organizations that 
represent the plastics industry in the United States – namely the American Chemistry Council 
(ACC), the Plastics Industry Association (PIA), and the American Recycled Plastic Bag Alliance 
(APBA) (formerly the American Progressive Bag Alliance) – participate in efforts to protect 
plastic bag use through lobbying and funding of candidates, among other things. 
The opposite of a statewide plastic bag ban is statewide preemption laws. These laws – 
which essentially ban plastic bag bans – prevent local municipalities from imposing bag bans at 
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lower levels of government, effectively making bag bans illegal and thereby safeguarding the 
manufacture of plastic bags. Some suggest that a reason to pass preemption laws is so that a state 
will have uniform laws throughout, arguing that it will be too confusing for citizens to keep track 
of where they can and can’t receive plastic bags if municipalities are allowed to have their own 
laws. This is but one form of messaging used to justify the reversal of laws supported by citizens 
of certain cities like Minneapolis which passed a plastic bag ban that became invalid after 
statewide preemption (Williams, 2017). The plastics industry has worked to push the concept of 
recycling and get the messaging out that alternatives to plastic bags cause more environmental 
damage even though this has been disproven. This argument has been used to rationalize 
preemption laws, and the plastics industry has spent millions of dollars on this messaging 
(Ballotpedia). They have fought against ballot measures seeking to restrict plastic bags and 
funded campaigns for candidates at the federal and state level. The plastics industry has injected 
a considerable amount of money into the political sphere in order to protect their products and 
their income stream by influencing politicians. As an example, Helix Poly is one of the major 
plastic bag manufacturers in the country. They are housed in Idaho where a state lawmaker who 
represents the district that houses Helix Poly’s plastic packaging facility proposed a preemption 
bill that led to the prohibition of plastic bag bans in the state (Times-News, 2016). 
In order to study these topics, this paper investigates several hypotheses. The first deals 
with the issue of plastic bag legislation and understanding how partisanship is related to plastic 
bag policy. Since a goal of this research paper is to better recognize conditions under which 
plastic bag bans or preemptions are likely to occur, one of the most significant components of the 
issue is whether there is a partisan aspect to plastic bag bans. There has been much research done 
on the partisan divide concerning environmental issues. Gray et al. (2018) state that it is widely 
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believed that states with Democratic leadership will support environmental policy more than 
Republican led states. However, while they mention studies that have illustrated this empirically, 
they also provide examples of the opposite being true – where a Republican governor enacted 
progressive environmental law, and a Democratic governor restricted environmental law. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible to hypothesize that plastic bag legislation may follow the general 
trend where Democrats support regulating it and Republicans do not.  
Based on this, the following Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 have been developed and 
will be explored here:  
H1: Plastic bag bans will occur less in historically Republican states than in 
historically Democratic states. 
H2: Preemption laws prohibiting plastic bag bans will occur less is historically 
Democratic states than in historically Republican states.  
Additionally, this research looks at whether or not there is a relationship between the 
amount of interparty competition in the state, as presented in the Ranney competition index 
(Gray et al., 2018). The commonly used Ranney index, from which the Ranney competition 
index is calculated, was developed by political scientist Austin Ranney in his 1965 publication 
“Parties in State Politics.” It is a measure of the strength of the Democratic Party, over a specific 
period of time, in state government, accounting for the proportion of seats in House, Senate and 
governor’s elections that are Democratic (Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993). Based on this 
number, the Ranney competition index is calculated for each state, and it is this Ranney 
competition index that is used in this paper. (See the Methodology section for more detail on the 
calculation). 
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It is anticipated that where there is less party competition, it is easier to pass either a 
plastic bag ban or preemption because more competition from the opposing party would make it 
harder to enact those laws – which is another indicator as to whether or not plastic bag legislation 
is a partisan issue. Looking at both competition and partisanship will help to create a better 
picture of the political aspects that may or may not influence plastic bag legislation. As such, the 
following Hypothesis 3 has been created.   
H3: Statewide plastic bag policies (either preemption or bag bans/fees) will occur 
more in states with a lower Ranney competition index. 
In addition to these three hypotheses, a discussion on the ways the plastics industry has 
sought to influence policies in the United States is presented. While the plastic bag policies being 
examined in this paper are at the state level, there is a debate going on at the federal level, as 
well. Information on the campaign contributions and lobbying efforts from the plastics industry 
at the state level is not readily available and could not be located for each state during the writing 
of this paper. However, there is a robust amount of data available at the federal level. Since 
looking at the financial contributions made at the federal level can illustrate if there is a partisan 
trend in how the plastics industry spends their money, these data are examined here.  
One exception to the lack of state data is the state of California which does have a robust 
set of data that has been made publicly available. This includes both campaign contributions to 
state candidates and lobbying efforts specific to state plastic bag ballot measures. An analysis of 
this data is also done to illustrate if there is a partisan trend at the state level in California. 
However, it is important to note that since only California is being examined at the state level, it 
would be inaccurate to assume the findings there are representative of all states since there are 
possibly unique circumstances in California that could make it an outlier. Further study would be 
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required to examine campaign and lobbying contributions from the plastics industry in all states 
before drawing any significant conclusions. 
Below is a literature review, followed by a discussion on the methodology used in each 
area of research, and finally the results and conclusions are presented.  
Literature Review 
Plastic waste is a concern across the globe (Ubomba-Jaswa and Kalebaila, 2020). To 
preserve human and ecological health, there have been calls to classify plastic waste as 
hazardous (Rochman et al., 2013) and to consider classifying it as a planetary boundary threat 
since it poses a significant threat to sustainability (Villarrubia-Gomez et al., 2017). Scientists 
estimated that in 2010, 275 million metric tons of plastic waste were generated in 192 coastal 
countries and that 4.8 to 12.7 million metric tons of plastic entered the ocean. This amount is 
predicted to increase by order of magnitude by 2025 (Jambeck et al., 2015). Additionally, the 
ecological, social, and economic impacts of marine plastic are expansive (MclLgorm, 2011), 
with the economic cost estimated to be between $3,300 and $33,000 per tonne of marine plastic 
entering the oceans per year (Beaumont et al., 2019), impacting tourism (Jang et al., 2014; Willis 
et al., 2018).  
The negative impacts of the commonly used plastics on humans and wildlife has been 
well documented with regards to microplastics and nanoplastics (Rodriques et al., 2019). These 
materials have long polymer chains that can be toxic, resulting in human and environmental 
hazards due to their polymer matrix, additives, degradation products, and adsorbed contaminants. 
Exposure to microparticles and nanoparticles of polyethylene, which plastic bags are made of, 
had a significant negative impact on microbes in the marine environment (Machado, et al., 2020) 
and exposure to other microplastics such as polystyrene, which can be found in disposable 
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cutlery, can impact reproduction in marine life (Sussarellu et al, 2016). Human consumption of 
microplastics through the consumption of fish and other affected seafood, which accounts for 17 
percent of animal protein consumed by humans, is but one avenue for human uptake of plastics 
since microplastics have been found in beer, honey and sea salt (Smith et al., 2018). The negative 
impacts of plastics on humans, which include physical and chemical toxicity, continue to be 
studied but are of particular concern for children (Smith et al., 2018). With the impacts of 
microplastics on marine life being well documented and the ability to remove these particles 
from the oceans being virtually impossible, reducing the use of plastic by humans is the only 
feasible method of stopping this pollution source (Galloway and Lewis, 2016).  
Reducing the use of plastics as a whole can be accomplished by targeting plastics that are 
non-essential. While plastics used in life saving medical devices serve a purpose that arguably 
justifies their existence, other single use plastics are less essential. This category would include 
items such as plastic shopping bags, plastic cutlery, and other to-go containers. Of the 300 
million tons of plastic produced annually, 50 percent is for single-use purposes (Plastic Oceans; 
Paco, 2017). 
The use of plastic bags is staggering, and in 2014, there were 103.465 billion single-use 
plastic bags consumed in the United States (Wagner, 2017). While plastic recycling as a whole 
has been impaired globally since China enacted its National Sword policy, these bags in 
particular are difficult to recycle, can harm automated recycling systems, and are a significant 
source of litter both on land and in marine waters (Wagner, 2017; Caverly, 2019; Applebome). 
The logical step would be to limit the use of these products as a way of reducing the 
consumption of non-essential plastics. Some believe Congress should use its Commerce Clause 
Powers to enact federal legislation on single-use plastics (King, 2019), but others oppose placing 
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restrictions on the use of plastics, with plastic bags receiving a great deal of focus from a 
legislative standpoint where statewide preemption laws have rendered it impossible for local 
municipalities to restrict plastic bag use. Due to this focus that has been placed on plastic bags, 
this paper looks at them specifically. Often, they are the first single use plastic to be regulated 
and therefore can be seen as a gateway product that may lead to the regulation of other single use 
plastics. For example, this regulation sequence is exactly what occurred in Seattle (Wu, 2018). 
In looking at the partisan nature of these policies, it is interesting that while there have 
been numerous articles written by news sources, in trade publications, and on individual 
websites, little academic research has been conducted on the topic. Instead, the closest academic 
literature in the field to this issue comes from scholarship on climate change. Therefore, this 
related topic is examined herein.   
Party polarization has deepened at every level in recent years, extending far beyond 
policy preferences such that it is now part of virtually every aspect of popular environmental 
thought (Guber, 2013). Gallop polls from 1998 to 2008 show that when asked if people believe 
global warming has already begun, Democrats’ belief increased by thirty percentage points, from 
46 percent up to 76 percent, while Republicans’ belief decreased in that same period from 47 
percent down to 41 percent (Guber, 2013). Additionally, Republicans increasingly believe that 
the media exaggerates the concern over global warming, and they believe warming trends are not 
anthropomorphic but are the result of natural causes. Since An Inconvenient Truth was released, 
the number of Americans who believe we have solid evidence of global warming has gone from 
77 percent down to 59 percent. This they mainly attribute to the views of Republicans. (Guber, 
2013). 
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The idea that climate change was a hoax dates back to articles from the early 1990’s, 
which focused on it being a form of environmental colonialism by environmentalists to bolster 
their antimarket/anticonsumption campaigns or as a ploy by scientists to enhance research funds 
(Cass, 2010). While in the United States this issue is politically linked, in much of the world 
climate change is a topic that is widely believed and not politicized (Collomb, 2014; Lahsen, 
2005). In Europe, there are fringe actors who assert climate change is not real, but unlike in the 
United States, where these voices are given a legitimate media platform and have real access to 
powerful figures in Washington, in Europe they are widely discredited (Collomb, 2014). 
Wealthy conservatives and those with vested interest in fossil fuels drive climate change denial 
based on the words of small groups of perhaps ten scientists who deny climate change. Unlike in 
Germany, Sweden and England, where there are perhaps a few skeptics, in the United states 
these efforts result in large resistance movements where these few scientists are regarded with 
authority (Lahsen, 2005, 143).  
This variation between the United States and other countries provides an important 
observation in that it lends itself to the idea that in the United States, there is a pattern of 
Republican behavior where even in the face of worldwide scientific evidence and scientific 
consensus, beliefs about topics of environmental concern are dismissed. This distinction is 
important when considering the topic of plastic bag policies in that even when the scientific 
evidence is present, it is plausible to hypothesize that policy choices of Republican candidates 
will be divergent.  
In an effort to understand why there may be support for the continued use of a product 
that causes negative impacts to humans and the environment, literature on interest groups is 
examined. Interest groups have long been studied in their influence on politics (Dur, 2019; 
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Holyoke, 2020). Campaign contributions from interest groups are found to occur due to an 
interest in influencing election outcomes or influencing policies (Grossman and Helpman, 1996). 
Increased spending afforded by interest group donations allows candidates to reach uninformed 
voters or to otherwise mobilize voters. Presumably, in return, the candidate will support the 
needs of the interest group once he or she is elected. This can result in the interests of these 
groups being put ahead of the average voter. It has been found that interest groups are more 
likely to target the party with greater chances of winning an election (Grossman and Helpman, 
1996). 
In the case of interest group influence, studies show that where there is strong support for 
a policy from interest groups in favor of it, only then are opposing interest groups relevant. Using 
renewable energy as an example, it was found that while data showed a positive effect on the 
growth of renewable markets when there were strong support coalitions, this effect was 
diminished by how strong the manufacturing industry was in that area. This supports the notion 
that the strength of the manufacturing presence in a given region has an impact on environmental 
policy or why there may be less interest group activity in regions where there are less 
environmental actors. 
Along similar lines, party competition may have an influence on policy, as well. Where 
the race is closer, interest groups on either side may be more motivated to engage. The use of the 
Ranney competition index, which has been used in other studies and is well regarded (Gray, 
2018; Flavin and Shufeldt, 2016; Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993), is used in this study to 
examine the linkage between party competition and plastic bag policies. 
As with any change to an industry as large as the plastics industry, restricting plastic bag 
use would have negative impacts, as well. A study in Jordan shows that there would be an impact 
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to jobs if there were full or partial bans put in place, with some estimates showing 46 percent of 
jobs in plastic bag manufacturing facilities could be lost, or more if factories were shut down 
altogether (Saidan, Ansour and Saidan, 2017). One area that could offset that job loss would be 
to increase the production of reusable bags (Surfrider Foundation). There are studies that show a 
higher footprint from reusable bags on the environment, claiming the impact of single-use plastic 
bags is lower than the alternatives (Rujnic-Sokele and Baric, 2014). However, it is important to 
consider the reduced impact of reusable bags when reuse rates are high and when taking into 
consideration a littering indicator (Green and DeMeo, 2012; Civancik-Usla, et al., 2019). It can 
be argued that these studies do not quantitatively account for the aforementioned impacts on 
marine life from plastics being present in the environment. While it is true that the volume of 
plastic in the oceans is not only from plastic bags, reducing the use of plastic bags is a first step 
towards reducing other single use plastics, which is a necessary step toward achieving the overall 
plastic waste reduction necessary to make a significant change in our current unsustainable 
trajectory. 
The research presented here will seek to evaluate possible partisan patterns and will 
examine the efforts done by interest groups in the plastics industry to influence politicians. As 
little to no academic work has been previously written on this topic, this research should fill a 
gap of understanding the impact of partisan politics and special interest monies on plastic bag 
laws and provide a beneficial analysis for use in the field. 
Methodology 
This research involves three hypotheses with several sets of data that support this effort.  
The first set of data is used in both analyses and involves statewide policy research. For 
this paper, plastic bag polices were examined – which includes both preemption and statewide 
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bag bans/fees – in all fifty states and the District of Columbia to find any policy that is either 
fully enacted or has passed at least one chamber of the state legislature. The source of these data 
is each individual state legislature, and the findings presented here are current as of June 2020.  
The second set of data is the historical partisanship of states that have plastic bag 
legislation. State government data is used rather than federal election patterns because the plastic 
bag policies are passed at the state level. Therefore, the state government makeup is of increased 
significance. 
This effort involved compiling data presented by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL, 2020) on the make-up of state legislatures and the governor’s office from 
2010 through 2020. This was used to create a table showing which party had control of the 
governorship and which party had control of the legislature, or if there was a split (meaning the 
legislature was split between parties), for each year and for each state. Next, these results were 
combined to determine when a party had full control of a state’s government for each year. If 
there was a split – meaning no single party controlled both chambers of the legislature and the 
governor’s office – this was indicated that as well. From here, it was determined if one party 
controlled the whole government of each state the majority (>50 percent) of the years (2010-
2020) or if there was a split the majority of the time. Next, a bivariate analysis was performed 
where party control of the state is the independent variable and plastic bag policy (either a plastic 
bag ban or preemption) is the dependent variable. What percentage of plastic bag bans occur in 
primarily Republican controlled states and what percentage of plastic bag bans occur in primarily 
Democrat controlled states was then calculated. Also calculated was what percentage of 
preemption laws occur in Republican states and what percentage of preemption laws occur in 
Democratic states. This is used to analyze Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
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This report also examines interparty competition by looking at the Ranney competition 
index (Gray et al., 2018; Flavin and Shufeldt, 2016; Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993), with the 
intention of illustrating whether increased party competition has an impact on plastic bag policy. 
The Ranney party control index is a calculation that measures control of government, with 0 
indicating full Republican control and 1 indicating full Democrat control. It averages several 
components, including proportion of success, duration of success, and frequency of divided 
control. When the score is 0.5 – the mid-point – control is evenly split between parties. This 
would mean that there is a highly competitive environment. 
The Ranney competition index, which is being used in this research paper, is calculated 
as one minus the absolute value (i.e. the positive value) of one half minus Ranney, with Ranney 
being the calculated value mentioned above.  
 
The Ranney competition index measures how close the competition in a given state is to 
“perfect.” This ranges from 0.5 to 1.0 (from no competition up to perfect competition) (Gray et 
al., 2018). The values used in this paper are taken from the book Politics in the American States: 
A Comparative Analysis (Gray et al., 2018). In this publication, the authors calculate the Ranney 
competition index for the period of 2012-2017 (with a single number calculated for each state 
over this period of time). It is being used here as the index score coincides with or immediately 
proceeds most of the time periods that plastic bag policies were enacted (Figure 2 shows dates 
policies were passed by the state governments). 
To determine if there is a relationship between competition in a state and plastic bag 
policies, a simple logit model was used where there being a plastic bag policy (either a ban or 
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preemption) is the dependent variable and where the Ranney competition index value is the 
independent variable. This is done to see if there is an empirical relationship between a policy on 
plastic bags and competition. This is used to examine Hypothesis 3. 
Finally, there is a discussion on the financial contributions from the three plastics 
industry organizations that have ties to the plastic bag industry specifically, including the 
American Chemistry Council (ACC), the Plastics Industry Association (PIA), and the American 
Recycled Plastic Bag Alliance (APBA) (formerly the American Progressive Bag Alliance. Data 
at the federal level is compiled from the Center for Responsive Politics, which receives its data 
directly from the Senate Office of Public Records and Federal Election Commission (Center for 
Responsive Politics A, B, C, D). For the state level analysis, California is used as an example due 
to the robust amount of available data in the state. These data are taken directly from the 
California Secretary of State’s website (CA SOS). Once all the contributions are compiled, 
which party received more funding from the ACC or SPI was determined by performing a 
bivariate analysis, where the candidate’s party affiliation is the independent variable and the 
amount of funds given to them, on a scale of zero to infinity, is the dependent variable.  
Results 
In presenting the results of the research, this paper begins by looking at the plastic bag 
policies across the United States. Following this, the partisanship of the states that have plastic 
bag policies and the interparty competition within each state is examined. Finally, the presumed 
influence attempted by the plastics industry in terms of lobbying and campaign contributions is 
studied. 
STATEWIDE PLASTIC BAG POLICIES 
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Figure 1 presents a map that is color coded by state as follows: 1) grey indicates there is 
no existing statewide plastic bag legislation; 2) orange/yellow indicates there is a fully enacted 
plastic bag ban in that state (orange) OR that there is one pending that has passed at least one 
chamber of the legislature (yellow); and 3) purple/lavender indicates there is statewide 
preemption (purple) OR it has passed at least one chamber of the legislature (lavender).  
Only two states, Ohio and South Dakota, have preemption that is not fully enacted. In 
Ohio, it has been passed on a 
temporary basis for one year, 
and the permananet version of 
the law is pending. All other 
states coded in purple have 
preemption laws that have 
been fully enacted. In terms of 
plastic bag bans, five states – 
including Maryland, 
Massachusettes, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, and 
Rhode Island – have plastic 
bag bans that are pending 
(passed in at least one 
chamber). The rest of the states presented in yellow have fully enacted statewide plastic bag 
bans. 
PARTISANSHIP IN STATES WITH PASTIC BAG POLICIES (Hypothesis 1 & 2) 
Figure 1: Statewide Plastic Bag Policies 
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 are repeated here followed by a discussion on the findings of the 
analysis.  
H1: On average, plastic bag bans will occur less in historically Republican states 
than in historically Democratic states. 
H2: On average, preemption prohibiting plastic bag bans will occur less is 
historically Democrat states than in historically Republican states. 
First, the partisanship of each state is looked at to identify what the political makeup was 
at the time plastic bag legislation was passed. Figure 2 presents a timeline for each year from 
2008 to 2020 for each state and indicates: 1) whether the state was Republican controlled, 
Democrat controlled, or if the government was split; and 2) what year the legislation was fully 
enacted or when pending legislation was last passed in one chamber of the state assembly. These 
years were selected as all of the plastic bag legislation – both bag bans and preemption – were 
passed (or pending) during this time period. The exception here is Colorado which passed its 
legislation in 1993, when there was a split government.  
Figure 2 shows that eight of the nine states with an enacted plastic bag ban accomplished 
it when Democrats had full control of the state government. One state, Vermont, had a split 
government. The four states with pending legislation are in states with either full Democrat 
control or a split government. For states with preemption, 12 of the 16 states that have enacted 
preemption laws passed them when Republicans had full control of state government.  Four of 
the states with enacted preemption passed the laws when there was a split government. The two 
states with pending preemption had full Republican control. These findings support Hypotheses 
1 and Hypothesis 2. 
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Next, an analysis of the long-term partisanship of the state is performed since it can take 
time to get a law passed. For example, in California it was over a ten-year period of time that the 
state went from just requiring recycling containers to be provided in stores to passing a state-
wide plastic bag ban and getting it approved by voters. Thus, looking at the trends of state 
political control over a longer period of time is relevant. The long-term partisanship trend in a 
state indicates more of what the sustained ideology of the voters tends to be. Tables 1 and 2 show 
the plastic bag legislation beside the historical party of the state from 2008-2020 for states with 
plastic bag bans (Table 1) and states with preemption (Table 2). 
Column 2 of Tables 1 and 2 shows which party had control of the government and for 
what percent of the years (shown in parentheses). As displayed in Table 2, 71 percent of states 
that have plastic bag bans were Democrat controlled for the majority of the time over the 12-year 
period, while the other 29 percent of states had split governments for the majority of years. 
Likewise, as shown in Table 2, in states with preemption, 72 percent of states were Republican 
led over the 12-year period while 28 percent were split for the majority of years.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 1 and 2 look at states that had split governments the majority 
of the time. This is done to see what the breakdown would be if a majority party were assigned 
(i.e. which party came in on top if we ignore the split years). As shown, when taking this into 
account, Democrats are in control of government 100 percent of the time in states where there is 
a statewide plastic bag ban in effect or pending (Table 1). Likewise, Republicans are in control 
of government 89 percent of the time in states where there is preemption enacted or pending 
(Table 2). 
These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
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Table 1 




Majority Party Control 
From 2010-2020 when >50% 
of Years had Democrat 
control, Republican control, 
or Split control of gov  
(% indicated in parentheses)1 
Column 3 
Breakdown of Party 
Control if Majority of 
Years had Split Gov 
What party controlled 
more years when there 
was no split? 
Column 4 
Assigned Party Control 
Overall Results When 
Assigning Most Common 
Party to Those with Majority 
Split Government 
California DEMOCRAT (77% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
Connecticut DEMOCRAT (62% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
Delaware DEMOCRAT (100% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
Hawaii DEMOCRAT (77% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 




Maryland DEMOCRAT (54% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
Massachusetts DEMOCRAT (54% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
New Hampshire SPLIT (62% of yrs) 
Democrat=23%; 
Republican=15% DEMOCRAT 
New Jersey SPLIT (69% of yrs) Democrat=31% DEMOCRAT 
New York DEMOCRAT (62% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
Oregon DEMOCRAT (85% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
Rhode Island DEMOCRAT (54% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
Vermont SPLIT (54% of yrs) Democrat=46% DEMOCRAT 
Washington DEMOCRAT (85% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
TOTALS:  71% of states with plastic bag bans are 
Democrat controlled for the majority of years (omitting 
those where control was split for the majority of years) 
100% of states with plastic bag bans are Democrat 
controlled for the majority of years (when assigning party 
to split states) 
Notes: 1- Options for party control are Democrat, Republican or Split. The number in parenthesis is what percent of the time the 
indicated party (or split) occurred. As an example, for California, the number in parenthesis is 77%. This means 77% of the years 
from 2008-2020 California had full Democrat control of state government. The other 23% would either be Republican or Split (in 
this case, it was split, see Figure 2).  








Majority Party Control 
From 2010-2020 when >50% 
of Years had Democrat 
control, Republican control, 
or Split control of gov  
(% indicated in parentheses)1 
Column 3 
Breakdown of Party 
Control if Majority of 
Years had Split Gov 
What party controlled 
more years when there 
was no split? 
Column 4 
Assigned Party Control 
Overall Results When 
Assigning Most Common 
Party to Those with Majority 
Split Government 
Arizona REPUBLICAN (100%)   REPUBLICAN 
Colorado DEMOCRAT (54% of yrs)   DEMOCRAT 
Florida REPUBLICAN (100%)   REPUBLICAN 
Idaho REPUBLICAN (100%)   REPUBLICAN 
Indiana REPUBLICAN (77%)   REPUBLICAN 
Iowa NONE (NONE OVER 50%) 
Democrat=9%; 
Republican=31%. REPUBLICAN 
Michigan REPUBLICAN (62%)   REPUBLICAN 
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Table 2 




Majority Party Control 
From 2010-2020 when >50% 
of Years had Democrat 
control, Republican control, 
or Split control of gov  
(% indicated in parentheses)1 
Column 3 
Breakdown of Party 
Control if Majority of 
Years had Split Gov 
What party controlled 
more years when there 
was no split? 
Column 4 
Assigned Party Control 
Overall Results When 
Assigning Most Common 
Party to Those with Majority 
Split Government 
Minnesota SPLIT (85%) Democrat=15%. DEMOCRAT 
Mississippi REPUBLICAN (69%)   REPUBLICAN 
Missouri SPLIT (69%) Republican=31%. REPUBLICAN 
North Dakota REPUBLICAN (100%)   REPUBLICAN 
Ohio REPUBLICAN (77%)   REPUBLICAN 
Oklahoma REPUBLICAN (77%)   REPUBLICAN 
Pennsylvania SPLIT (69%) Republican=31%. REPUBLICAN 
South Dakota REPUBLICAN (100%)   REPUBLICAN 
Tennessee REPUBLICAN (77%)   REPUBLICAN 
Texas REPUBLICAN (100%)  REPUBLICAN 
Wisconsin REPUBLICAN (62%)   REPUBLICAN 
NOTES: 72% of states with preemption are republican 
controlled for the majority of years (omitting those where 
control was split for the majority of years) 
89% of states with preemption are republican controlled 
for the majority of years (when assigning party to split 
states) 
Notes: 1-Options for party control are Democrat, Republican or Split. The number in parenthesis is what percent of the time the 
indicated party (or split) occurred. As an example, for Indiana, the number in parenthesis is 77%. This means 77% of the years 
from 2008-2020 Indiana had full Republican control of state government. The other 23% would either be Democrat or Split (in this 
case, it was split, see Figure 2).  
2-Colorado has preemption due to a decades old law related to recycling that did not have the original intention of preempting 
plastic bag bans. The party control of the state often being Democrat and the existence of preemption laws is perhaps misleading 
for this reason.  
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020.  
 
The above analysis, as presented in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2, illustrates that both 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are correct. There is a significant partisan aspect to plastic bag 
policies.   
INTERPARTY COMPETITION (Hypothesis 3) 
This section examines the connection between the level of interparty competition within a 
state and the likelihood of that state having a plastic bag policy. 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis is repeated here followed by a discussion on the findings. 
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H3: On average, statewide plastic bag policies (either preemption or bag bans/fees) 
will occur more in states with a lower Ranney competition index. 
Table 3 presents the Ranney competition index (Gray et al., 2018) coupled with plastic 
bag policies. This analysis looks to see if a policy occurs more when there is more competition in 
the state, irrespective of whether the policy is a plastic bag ban or preemption. Table 3 lists all 
states in order of lowest to highest Ranney competition index and is color coded to indicate what 
the policy is in the state. The Ranney competition index ranges from 0.5 to 1.0, where a lower 
value indicates less competition, and a higher value indicates more competition.  
Table 3 
Ranney Competition Index Compared to Plastic Bag Legislation by State 
(WHITE = no legislation, ORANGE/YELLOW=Plastic Bag Ban Enacted (orange) OR Passed in At 
Least One Chamber of the Legislature (yellow), PURPLE=Preemption Enacted (purple) OR Passed in 
At Least One Chamber of the Legislature (lavender) 
State Ranney Competition Index  State 
Ranney Competition 
Index  
Hawaii 0.667 New York 0.83 
Wyoming 0.679 Michigan 0.836 
South Dakota 0.702 Arizona 0.839 
Utah 0.715 North Carolina 0.84 
Tennessee 0.727 Alaska 0.848 
North Dakota 0.728 Arkansas 0.851 
Idaho 0.731 Illinois 0.854 
Rhode Island 0.743 Wisconsin 0.863 
California 0.749 Missouri 0.868 
Oklahoma 0.764 Colorado 0.878 
Massachusetts 0.765 Washington 0.891 
Delaware 0.766 Nebraska 0.893 
Kansas 0.771 Louisiana 0.899 
Alabama 0.777 Minnesota 0.912 
Ohio 0.782 New Jersey 0.913 
Indiana 0.785 Iowa 0.913 
Vermont 0.8 Pennsylvania 0.924 
Georgia 0.809 Montana 0.937 
Connecticut 0.809 Virginia 0.958 
Mississippi 0.817 Nevada 0.961 
Oregon 0.818 New Mexico 0.963 
Maryland 0.821 West Virginia 0.963 
South Carolina 0.824 Kentucky 0.968 
Florida 0.825 New Hampshire 0.981 
Texas 0.827 Maine 0.991 
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Table 3 
Ranney Competition Index Compared to Plastic Bag Legislation by State 
(WHITE = no legislation, ORANGE/YELLOW=Plastic Bag Ban Enacted (orange) OR Passed in At 
Least One Chamber of the Legislature (yellow), PURPLE=Preemption Enacted (purple) OR Passed in 
At Least One Chamber of the Legislature (lavender) 
State Ranney Competition Index  State 
Ranney Competition 
Index  
SOURCE: Gray, V. et al. 2018. Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: CQ Press. 
 
The values from Table 3 were input into R where a simple logistic regression model was 
created with whether or not there is a bag policy as the dependent variable and the Ranney 
competition index as the independent variable. A graph of the results was created and is 
presented in Figure 3. There appears to be a clear negative relationship between bag policy and 
competition in the state. In states with lower competition, the likelihood of the state having a 
plastic bag policy is over 80 percent. However, in higher competition environments, this value is 
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ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
Financial Influence of Plastic Bag Industry 
While the previous discussion centers around existing law and partisanship, this 
discussion will focus on the efforts by the plastics industry to influence policy. This section looks 
at both financial contributions, as well as a brief discussion on other areas where the industry is 
exerting its influence in ways that are not directly financial but could ultimately have a positive 
financial impact on the plastics industry. 
Campaign reporting requirements result in a robust set of available data on federal 
campaign contributions and lobbying efforts. The primary sources of funding that is examined 
come from three organizations that represent the plastics industry, including the ACC, PIA, and 
APBA. These organizations participate in efforts to protect plastics, including plastic bag use, 
through lobbying and funding of candidates. They are interconnected to one another as well. The 
ACC used to house the APBA until 2012 when it moved over the PIA in an effort to increase 
their resources to “defend plastic bags and promote the recycling of all plastic film” (ACC, 
2011(2)). ACC and SPI contributed to lobbying on the federal level and gave direct contributions 
to federal candidates. The ACC has also actively worked to stop plastic bag bans in California 
(ACC, 2010 and ACC, 2011). As such, all three are involved in advocating against plastic bag 
bans and arguing for preemption.  
Lobbying: As shown in Table 4, the total federal lobbing amount from the ACC from 
1998-2019 is approximately $141.5 million. For the same period of time, the SPI donated 
approximately $6.5 million. 
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TABLE 4 
AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL FEDERAL LOBBYING 
EXPENDITURES (1998-2019) 
Year ACC SPI 
1998 $4,998,760 $704,000 
1999 $5,390,000 $708,000 
2000 $4,320,000 $708,000 
2001 $3,340,000 $708,000 
2002 $2,240,000 $0 
2003 $2,230,000 $380,000 
2004 $5,360,000 $100,000 
2005 $2,820,000 $35,000 
2006 $2,886,938 $160,000 
2007 $2,390,000 $130,000 
2008 $3,940,000 $242,000 
2009 $7,020,000 $195,000 
2010 $8,130,000 $180,000 
2011 $10,280,000 $290,000 
2012 $9,070,000 $260,000 
2013 $12,250,000 $335,000 
2014 $11,364,703 $360,000 
2015 $10,050,000 $200,000 
2016 $9,020,000 $210,000 
2017 $7,440,000 $240,000 
2018 $9,280,000 $240,000 
2019 $7,630,000 $210,000 
TOTAL $141,450,401 $6,595,000 
PORTION ALLOTED TO SUBSIDIARIES 
ACC 
ACC N American Flame 





Styrene Information & 
Research Center $340,000 
SOURCE: 1: Center for Responsive Politics. ND. American Chemistry Council 
(Lobbying Profile). https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-
lobbying/clients/summary?id=D000000365&cycle=2019 





Contributions to candidates: As presented in Table 5, from 2008 to 2018 the ACC 
donated over $3 million to federal candidates and the SPI donated just over $178,000. This is 
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broken down by party. The percentage given to Republicans far exceeds the amount given to 
Democrats from both the ACC (with 69 percent given to Republicans, 30 percent to Democrats) 
and the SPI (with 88 percent given to Republicans, and 12 percent given to Democrats).  
These contributions were likely made to further the interests of the plastics industry 
beyond plastic bag legislation and is not specific to state level politics. However, as this is a 
sizable amount of funding, it illustrates the industry’s ability to exert significant influence.  
 
TABLE 5 












1998 $125,199 77% 23% $9,500 89% 11% 
2000 $111,150 78% 22% $0 NA NA 
2002 $202,581 78% 22% $1,000 100% 0% 
2004 $118,396 75% 25% $0 NA NA 
2006 $166,500 78% 18% $0 NA NA 
2008 $286,929 45% 55% $9,500 89% 11% 
2010 $304,057 43% 56% $15,700 87% 13% 
2012 $330,000 72% 28% $35,500 93% 7% 
2014 $418,500 74% 24% $29,000 69% 31% 
2016 $403,000 74% 26% $22,500 87% 13% 
2018 $549,000 64% 36% $55,750 90% 10% 
TOTAL $3,015,312  69%  30% $178,450 88% 12% 
SOURCE: 1: Center for Responsive Politics. ND. American Chemistry Council (Summary of Federal Candidate Funding). 
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00252338 




State level: Data on campaign contributions and lobbying efforts at the state level are not 
readily available for most states. Data is available for California and it is presented here as an 
example. There are many reasons why California is an interesting state to look at in terms of 
plastics industry funding. However, these reasons also support the argument for why the state is 
not typical or representative of what other states may experience and therefore data on California 
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should not be extrapolated to other states. These factors include the long, multi-year and highly 
contested effort to get the plastic bag ban enacted statewide there, the number of plastic bag 
companies located within the state, the high buying power of California’s large population, and 
the proximity to Silicone Valley.  
Contributions in California were made directly to the plastics bag ballot measures that 
resulted in plastic bags being banned. California allowed voters to decide if plastic bags should 
be banned through two ballot measures, 65 and 67. Proposition 65 was supported by the ARPBA 
(then called the APBA), which if approved would have enacted a fee for plastic bags that would 
have gone to the Wildlife Conservation Fund. If Proposition 65 got more votes than Proposition 
67, it would have been enacted. Proposition 67, if approved, would have prohibited plastic bags 
in the state. However, if Proposition 67 received more votes, it would be enacted. Therefore, by 
supporting Proposition 65 and opposing Proposition 67, the ARPBA was looking at the scenario 
that would have kept plastic bags in the state while giving their support an environmental spin 
(i.e. donating to the Wildlife Conservation Fund). In November of 2016, Proposition 67 received 
the most votes and was enacted, banning plastic bags statewide (Ballotpedia).  
Table 6 shows the total amount the ARPBA spent in lobbying, which comes to over $6 
million. Table 6 also shows the companies that contributed to the organization, and as shown, 
most of them are chemical or plastics companies located in California (plastic bag ban), Texas 
(preemption), New Jersey (plastic bag ban), South Carolina (no legislation) and Mississippi 
(plastic bag ban). Table 6 also shows that while there are several companies within the state of 
California, several of the largest contributors were from out of state. This indicates that what 
happens in any one state may have an impact throughout the industry. 
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TABLE 6 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARPBA FOR CA BALLOT MEASURES: YES ON 65 AND NO ON 67 (2013-2016) 
COMPANY STATE AMOUNT (2013-2016) 
Advance Polybag, Inc. TX $946,833 
Crown Poly, Inc. CA $12,000 
Durabag Co., Inc. CA $50,000 
Elkay Plastics Co., Inc. CA $4,000 
Formosa Plastics Corporation U.S.A. NJ $1,148,442 
Helix Poly Co. LLC SC $2,783,739 
Heritage Plastics Inc. MS $50,000 
Metro Poly Co. CA $2,500 
Omega Extruding Corp. CA $1,000 
Prince Rubber and Plastics Co. Inc. TX $25,000 
Restore California - Jim Frazier Ballot Measure Committee CA $2,000 
Sid Marantz & Associates CA $1,500 
Superbag Corp. TX $1,109,370 
The Dow Chemical Company TX $10,000 
TOTAL $6,146,383 
SOURCE: California Secretary of State. ND. Cal Access. http://cal-
access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1372902&session=2017.  
NOTE: ARPBA was called APBA at the time, and they supported Yes on 65 and no on 67 (referendum against SB 270).  
 
The next set of data examined is the contributions from the ACC, SPI, and Plastics 
California (PC) to candidates in California running for state senate, state assembly, lieutenant 
governor, or governor. As can be seen in Table 7, the combined amount from the ACC and SPI 
is $662,407. However, what is surprising here is that 65 percent of that amount was given to 
Democrats and 35 percent to Republicans. This is the opposite of what was seen in federal 
contributions. (See the summary section below Table 7 for a discussion on this.) It is also of 
interest to note that the funding from the SPI and PC was largely replaced by funding from the 
ACC, further suggesting the possibility that the two agencies work with one another. 
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TABLE 7 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO STATE CANDIDATES, CALIFORNIA (2001-2019) 
Year 
ACC  SPI and PC 
Republican Democrat Republican Democrat 
Count Amount  Count Amount Count Amount  Count Amount 
2001         17 $15,950 15 $15,000 
2003         24 $40,000 10 $10,000 
2005         15 $19,590 10 $19,000 
2007 6 $9,100 9 $13,500 1 $1,000 8 $8,702 
2009 7 $10,000 23 $33,500 1 $1,000 0 $0 
2011 26 $32,900 52 $73,500 4 $4,950 7 $9,500 
2013 17 $24,000 64 $91,015         
2015 24 $29,500 39 $59,200         
2017 24 $35,000 45 $61,500         
2019 9 $7,000 28 $38,000         
TOTAL 113 $147,500 260 $370,215 62 $82,490 50 $62,202 
% 30% 28% 70% 72% 55% 57% 45% 43% 
SOURCE: California Secretary of State. ND. http://powersearch.sos.ca.gov/advanced.php 
NOTE: There were cases where multiple contributions were given to a single individual, however as they were 
on different dates and were recorded separately, they are considered separate contributions. 
Data includes contributions to California candidates for state senate, state assembly, governor, lieutenant 
governor, and partisan groups that support candidates. This includes contributions from the American 
Chemistry Council (ACC), the Plastics Industry Association (PIA) and Plastics California a PAC of the Plastics 
Industry (PA). PIA and PC are combined. 
 
 
Summary of Financial Contributions 
A large sum of money – in the range of $150 million – has been spent on lobbying and 
campaign contributions by plastics industry organizations at the federal level and in California. 
This does not account for money spent at the state level in other states. This suggests the industry 
has a great deal at stake when it comes to the regulation of plastics. Interestingly, while the 
contributions to federal candidates did follow the partisan leanings of plastic bag policies, where 
more funds were given to Republican candidates than Democratic candidates, in California the 
opposite was true. This could be explained by the findings of a study previously discussed on 
interest group spending which found that oftentimes, interest groups will contribute to the 
candidate most likely to win the election (Grossman and Helpman, 1996). While the analysis has 
not been done to see if the candidates the plastics industry contributed to actually won those 
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elections, as California is a historically Democratic state, it is certainly plausible that this way of 
thinking explains this pattern of campaign contributions in California. A comprehensive study 
examining contributions to all fifty states would be a useful future study that could provide 
interesting data from which to draw additional conclusions on this topic. 
Other Influence of Plastics Industry 
Influence by the plastics industry can occur in unexpected ways in addition to funding. In 
California, the ACC lobbied California school officials and put pressure on them to include 
positive messaging on plastic shopping bags in the newly adopted environmental curriculum 
(Rust, 2011). A section titled “The Advantages of Plastic Shopping Bags” was in the eleventh-
grade teacher’s edition, where the title and some of the language in the textbook were taken 
nearly verbatim from the ACC. The ability of a private industry lobbyist with financial gains 
attached to this messaging to penetrate the curriculum of K-12 children in public schools 
illustrates the far-reaching and concerning influence this industry has.  
Another topic of concern is the area of model bills, written by corporations and put into 
state law. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALECP) is an organization made up of 
state legislators and other stakeholders, funded largely by corporations and powerful players 
such as the Koch Brothers (ALEC; Sourcewatch; O’Dell and Pensenstadler, 2019). This group 
creates model bills that are written by special interests who push forth the agenda of those who 
write them. This includes plastic bag preemption bills (O’Dell and Pensenstadler, 2019). An 
example is the case in Ohio, where the bill for preemption closely resembles the bill developed 
by ALEC (Borchardt, 2019). The key concern with these model bills and how they are being 
used is that the special interest groups and corporations creating them do not have a direct 
lobbying connection to the proposed bill because the bill was not funded specific to that state, so 
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there is no money trail. Nevertheless, “these copycat bills amount to the nation’s largest, 
unreported special interest campaign, driving agendas in every statehouse and touching nearly 
every area of public policy” (O’Dell and Pensenstadler, 2019). The ways these special interest 
groups are able to get their issues addressed legislatively is something that should be studied and 
understood further in how it relates to plastics industry legislation. 
Conclusion and Future Research 
This study provides interesting findings. First, there is a very strong relationship between 
the party control of a state and what kind of plastic bag legislation that state is inclined to pass. 
All statewide plastic bag bans that have been enacted occurred in states that never had a 
Republican controlled government over the study period of 2010-2020. Only one state with 
pending legislation had two years of Republican control. Otherwise, all other states in all other 
years had Democrat control or a split government. Likewise, only Minnesota and Colorado are 
states that have preemption and ever had a Democrat controlled government in the years studied. 
Minnesota had Democrat control for two years, and Colorado has preemption based on a law 
from the 1990s that was enacted for other reasons but effectively resulted in preemption.  
This analysis indicates that plastic bag policies follow the same partisan pattern as other 
environmental topics such as climate change. It presents a continued pattern of behavior whereby 
Republicans enact policy that opposes environmental concerns, regardless of if those concerns 
are scientifically proven to have a negative impact on the planet, as is the case with plastics. 
Another interesting finding is that there is a link between competition in a state and 
policy enactment. This suggests that when attempting to progress a certain policy, one would be 
wise to look at states with less competition, provided the policy was aligned with the ideology of 
the state. In the future, it would be interesting to discover more about how ideology aligns with 
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plastic bag policy through an expansive, state to state study. In many states, especially those with 
preemption, there were plastic bag bans that were enacted or pending on a city- or county-wide 
basis that were made invalid by preemption. Since these are located in Republican controlled 
states, it would be interesting to compare the ideology of those cities, as well as the ideology of 
the states to determine if there is a link between ideology and plastic bag legislation. Also, it 
would be interesting to see if actual plastic bag use varies by state. By looking at states without 
plastic bag legislation, it would be informative to know if the per capita use is higher in 
Democrat or Republican states to see if there is any evidence that people are self-regulating 
based on their political ideals. 
Since this is a topic that is in its infancy, it is one that merits continued research. Plastic 
bag policies appear to be a gateway into other plastics being regulated, as seen in cities such as 
Seattle (Wu, 2018). As our world runs out of ways to manage the never-ending stream of plastic 
waste, we are going to have to address it whether we like it or not and whether there is pushback 
from the plastics industry. As this waste stream persists and alternatives are explored, we must 
understand how the special interests of a few can interfere and impact the public as a whole. 
Continued research should investigate the financial and other influences the plastics industry has 
on legislation. Additional research should include issues of environmental justice, where we 
examine the unbalanced impact on developing countries, as well as communities within the 
United States located near overflowing landfills and polluted waterways. Understanding how and 
where plastic related polices are being developed, and what their human, environmental, and 
economic impacts are, will be critical to creating a sustainable future for everyone. This would 
also include finding a way to transition away from our reliance on plastics in a manner that 
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would help those in the plastics industry transition to new more sustainable fields and mediate 
the negative economic impact on society. 
An interesting point regarding the economy is the situation in California. While the state 
has a statewide plastic bag ban in effect, they also house many plastics manufacturers. In fact, 
California has the most plastics industry employees in the country at approximately 78,500 
(Goldsberry, 2019). It would be interesting to examine why a state with progressive plastics 
policies would attract or retain this business. Perhaps there are other financial incentives that are 
not specific to the environment, such as tax concerns, access to production resources, or 
proximity to Silicon Valley, that attract these companies.  On the other hand, perhaps there is a 
benefit in having a presence in the state from a political standpoint. If the plastics industry can 
claim that regulations against the use of plastic will impact 78,500 employees within California, 
they make a more compelling argument against statewide bans. If they left the state, they would 
lose this argument. Since a state like California – which has a huge economy – is often a leader 
in progressive environmental policy, it is a state where perhaps the plastics industry can justify 
waging a costly battle. This is a topic that may warrant further investigation.  
Finally, the impact of COVID-19 on the regulation of and use of plastic bags should be 
examined. At the writing of this paper, the country is still in the midst of the pandemic and how 
it will change future regulation has yet to be seen. Some states such as in California and 
Connecticut lifted their plastic bag bans for a time but have now reimposed restrictions 
(Martichoux, 2020; Fawcett, 2020). Conversely, in Ohio, the one state that has preemption 
pending but not yet enacted, it is said that the governor will be passing the statewide preemption 
on plastic bag bans and has indicated the pandemic is the reason he will be ignoring requests to 
veto the bill (Kovac and Ludlow, 2020). In Maryland, where a plastic bag ban was pending, the 
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governor lifted restrictions due to COVID-19 and prohibited reusable bag use (Kurtz, 2020). 
These and other possible changes due to the spread of disease should be studied closely. It is of 
the utmost importance that the efforts made to reduce plastic waste are not undermined. As new 
data on how long the virus can live on surfaces is determined, as vaccines and other treatments 
become available, and as people become more comfortable with the concept of washing reusable 
bags, it is imperative that we not lose site of the real and significant risks plastic waste poses to 
humans and the environment. Allowing the plastics industry to capitalize on fears would be a 
detriment to us all, and we should be wary of the use of television and other online or print 
advertisements that use emotional appeals to sway public opinion and influence politics (Brader, 
2005; Weber, 2012; Abramowitz and Webster 2018). Likewise, we should be wary of industry 
messaging in educational materials, like that which the ACC advocated for in California. 
The plastics problem is not going to go away anytime soon. Understanding the dynamics 
behind its use and regulation is an important step toward solving this global problem.    
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